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Comment
Turning RICO on Its Head: Schiffels v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc. and the Need to Limit
Standing Under § 1962(d) to Plaintiffs Who
Allege Injuries From Racketeering Acts
Donald W. Cassidy
Carolyn Schiffels worked as a stock options trading assis-
tant for Kemper Financial Services, Inc.' Schiffels claimed that
her supervisor and several company officials operated a fraudu-
lent stock options trading scheme, and subsequently conspired
to cover up the scheme when she learned of its existence.2 Both
acts, if proven, would violate the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act ("RICO" or "the Act").3 Schiffels main-
tained that the defendants, to advance the coverup, wrongfully
discharged her when she reported the scheme to her superiors.4
Schiffels brought suit, claiming that her retaliatory discharge vi-
olated state law5 and RICO.6
1. Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 346-48 (7th Cir.
1992).
2. Id.
3. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp.
1991)).
4. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 346-47.
5. Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 909, 910 (N.D. Ill.
1991), rev'd, 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992). Schiffels had no written employment
contract for a specific time period; thus she was an "at-will" employee. All fifty-
one jurisdictions of the United States follow the same general rule that an at-
will employee can be discharged by his or her employer at any time, for any
reason whatsoever, or for no reason. See generally NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
INsTITUTn, EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: A 1985 STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 1-340
(David A. Cathcart & Mark S. Dichter eds., 1985) (summarizing employment
at-will presumption in each jurisdiction); see, e.g., Palmateer v. Intl Harvester
Co., 421 N.E. 2d 876, 877-78 (IM. 1985) (describing the general rule under Dli-
nois law). Thus, Schiffels generally would have no cause of action for her
discharge.
In Illinois, however, where Schiffels arose, courts recognize an exception to
the at-will doctrine when an employer's motivation for discharging an employee
contravenes public policy. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois has explained that
although there is no precise definition of the term "public policy," generally, it
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The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois dismissed Schiffels's RICO claim.7 The court held that
a plaintiff who alleges injury from a conspiracy to violate RICO,
but does not allege injury by one of the enumerated "predicate
acts" of racketeering that underlay the RICO violation, has no
standing to sue under RICO." The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court, holding that a plaintiff has
standing to sue under RICO for injury from any overt act in fur-
therance of a conspiracy to violate RICO.9
Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. illustrates the
current controversy' 0 over the appropriate scope of RICO's con-
spiracy provision" and its relationship to the Act's civil dam-
ages provision 12 in actions in which the plaintiff would be denied
standing under the Act's substantive "racketeering" prohibi-
concerns "what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collec-
tively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they
are silent, in its judicial decisions." Id. at 878.
Other jurisdictions also recognize, either at common law or by statute, an
action in tort for wrongful discharge based on a "public policy" theory. E.g.,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-36 (Cal. 1980) (holding
that employer's discharge of employee for refusing to participate in an illegal
scheme to fix gasoline prices was in violation of public policy).
6. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 346-48; see also 18 U.S.C §§ 1962(d), 1964(c)
(1988); infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (discussing the basic principles
and statutory structure of RICO).
7. Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 909, 913 (N.D. Ill.
1991), rev'd, 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. Id. at 912.
Generally, in order to have standing to sue, "a plaintiff must show: (1) that
the challenged conduct has caused injury in fact, and (2) that the interest
sought to be protected is within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question." JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVL PROCEDURE 327 (1985); see generally Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975) (discussing in detail the concept of standing).
Wrongful discharge, however, is not among the enumerated acts that con-
stitute "racketeering activity" under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 &
Supp. 1991); infra note 31 (providing text of provision). For this reason, the
district court in Schiffels dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. Schiffels, 767 F.
Supp. at 912.
9. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 348-49.
10. Commentators have hotly debated the appropriate breadth of RICO's
civil conspiracy provision. Compare Frederic Brooks, Note, Conspiracy Stand-
ing After Sedima, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRons. 423 (1992) (arguing that
RICO's conspiracy provision should be construed broadly) with 62 U.S.L.W.
2095-97 (1993) (reporting recent proceedings at the American Bar Association
(ABA) Annual Convention, wherein the ABA House of Delegates reaffirmed its
recommendation that Congress amend RICO's conspiracy provision to grant
standing only to plaintiffs who allege injuries derived from racketeering acts).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
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tions.13 Broad construction of the conspiracy provision has sig-
nificant financial implications for employers, as well as for other
RICO defendants, 14 and may fuel the fire of those critics of
RICO who contend that the Act is unconstitutionally vague.' 5
By construing the scope of the conspiracy term broadly and
thereby holding that plaintiffs have standing to sue when they
allege injury from any act committed in furtherance of a RICO
conspiracy, the Seventh Circuit followed the approach adopted
by the Third Circuit,16 and consciously rejected contrary deci-
sions reached by the First,'7 Second,' 8 Eighth,19 and Ninth20
Circuits.
This Comment examines the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Schiffels in the context of continued efforts by federal courts to
interpret the sweeping, innovative language of RICO while bal-
ancing the conflicting interpretive tensions between literalist
and purposive constructions of the Act. Part I describes RICO's
legislative history and background, focusing on the manner in
which Congress formulated RICO's civil damages provision and
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988). In Wil-
liams, two former vice presidents of Ashland Oil Co. alleged that their employer
dismissed them after they refused to participate in an illegal bribery scheme.
Id. at 640. The vice presidents brought suit under RICO, and the jury returned
a verdict awarding the plaintiffs $69.5 million in damages. Laura A. Ginger,
Employers' RICO Liability for the Wrongful Discharge of Their Employees, 68
NEB. L. Rav. 673, 675 (1989). The defendant appealed but later settled the case
for $25 million. Id. at 675 n.19.
The enormous liability of potential RICO defendants takes on even greater
significance because the lower courts have held unanimously that RICO recog-
nizes no right of third-party contribution. See, e.g., Miller v. Affiliated Fin.
Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1985). "Thus, RICO plaintiffs enjoy in
terrorem tactical advantages in RICO cases." Michael P. Kenny, Escaping the
RICO Dragnet in Civil Litigation: Why Won't the Lower Courts Listen to the
Supreme Court?, 30 DuQ. L. REv. 257,258 n.6 (1992) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Many a
prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a [RICO]
case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for
extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to
combat.")).
15. See infra notes 68-69, 137 and accompanying text (discussing the
vagueness doctrine and summarizing constitutional attacks against RICO).
16. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
17. See Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991).
18. See Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.
1990).
19. See Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993).
20. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991).
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conspiracy provision. Part II details the holding and reasoning
of Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. Part III compares
the Seventh Circuit's mechanistic, literalist interpretation of
RICO's conspiracy and civil damages provisions with other cir-
cuits' more purposive constructions of the provisions. This Com-
ment argues that the conspiracy provision's confusing language,
its legislative history, and recent Supreme Court precedent do
not compel the result in Schiffels. The Comment concludes that
such a broad interpretation of the provision, if widely adopted,
would turn RICO "on its head"-dangerously "federalizing"2 '
state law, leading to state-by-state inequities in the application
of RICO, duplicating existing state common law and statutory
remedies, and unnecessarily complicating the apportionment of
damages among various RICO plaintiffs.
I. THE RICO STATUTE: ITS STRUCTURE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. RICO's STATUTORY ScHEMi
Congress enacted RICO in 1970 in order to establish new
penal prohibitions, enhanced sanctions, and innovative reme-
dies to eradicate the unlawful activities of organized crime.22 In
the last decade, however, RICO has become an increasingly pop-
ular, although controversial, 23 tool in general civil litigation be-
cause of its apparently unlimited applicability.
Subsections (a) through (c) of § 1962 contain the Act's sub-
stantive prohibitions against racketeering. Subsection (a)
makes it unlawful for any person24 to use money derived from a
21. Cf. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (striking
down an expansive interpretation of the federal securities anti-fraud provisions
to avoid "federaliz[ing]" a substantial portion of state securities laws in the ab-
sence of congressional intent); see infra note 132 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the "federalization" concept as it applies to RICO).
22. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922, 922-23 (1970) (uncodified) (statement of findings and purpose).
23. See, e.g., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of
My Courtroom, WAi.L ST. J., May 19, 1989, at A14 ("I think that the time has
arrived for Congress to enact amendments to civil RICO to limit its scope to the
sort of wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or have some other reason
for being in federal court."); see also G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An
Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various
Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L.
REv. 851, 857 n.14 (1990) (citing participants in the debate over whether Con-
gress should reform RICO).
24. A "person" "includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988).
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"pattern of racketeering activity"2 5 to invest in an enterprise2 6
affecting interstate commerce. 27 Subsection (b) prohibits any
person from acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.28 Subsection (c)
prohibits any person from conducting the affairs of an enter-
prise, as an employee or associate of the enterprise, through a
pattern of racketeering activity.2 9 Section 1962(d) makes it un-
lawful to conspire to violate the first three subsections of
§ 1962.30
25. A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racke-
teering activity which have occurred within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988); see infra note 31 (listing acts constituting "racketeering
activity").
26. An "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, as-
sociation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
27. Congress may regulate matters affecting interstate commerce. U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Thus, the enterprises governed by § 1962 are those
engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
Subsection (a) makes it unlawful for a person to invest money derived from
a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt... to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988); see infra note 28 (comparing subsection (a) to sub-
section (b)).
28. "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
The difference between subsection (a) and subsection (b) is that subsection
(b) "requires the purpose of the pattern [of racketeering activity] to be to ac-
quire or maintain an interest in an enterprise, whereas (a) uses the pattern of
racketeering activity to generate income, which is subsequently invested in an
enterprise." Stephen D. Brown & Alan M. Lieberman, RICO Basics: A Primer,
35 VIL. L. REv. 865, 870 (1990) (third emphasis added).
29. "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... " 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
30. "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1988).
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RICO defines "racketeering activity" as any act "chargeable"
under nine classes of state criminal felony laws, any act "indicta-
ble" under fifty-four specific federal criminal provisions, any fed-
eral "offense" involving bankruptcy or securities fraud, and any
narcotics-related activities "punishable" under federal law.31
31. "[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, deal-
ing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relat-
ing to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft
from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felo-
nious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions),
section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with
access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relat-
ing to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud),
sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of crimi-
nal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or
local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a wit-
ness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating
against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relat-
ing to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation
of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of mone-
tary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), sec-
tion 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the com-
mission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual
exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relat-
ing to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relat-
ing to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts),
sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),
sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations), or section
501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale
of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, con-
cealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dan-
gerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E)
any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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These crimes are termed "predicate acts" for the act of
racketeering.32
Section 1964(c) of RICO provides a civil cause of action for
any person injured "by reason of a violation of section 1962."33
Remedies available to injured persons include treble damages
and the recovery of costs and attorney's fees.3 4
B. RICO's ANTITRUST ANTECEDENTS AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
3 5
Before RICO's enactment, the U.S. Department of Justice
employed antitrust law36 to fight organized crime.37 Indeed,
32. See Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (holding
that the definition of racketeering activity "consists of no more and no less than
commission of a [section 1961(1)] predicate act").
33. "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1988).
34. Id.
35. For a detailed discussion of RICO's legislative history, see G. Robert
Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1014-21 (1980).
36. The Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[elvery contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce... is... illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
One commentator has explained that the "contract, combination.., or con-
spiracy" language is best understood as an "alliterative compound noun,
roughly translated to mean 'concerted action.' There is little need to grapple
with issues about the meanings of the particular words of the statute nor to
mark nice distinctions among them." LAWRENCE A. SULIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 312 (1977).
The antitrust laws also create a private cause of action to recover treble
damages and attorney's fees for "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Congress modeled RICO's civil damage provision on this
earlier statute. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,
371 U.S. 94 (1962) (enjoining the activities of labor union members under the
antitrust laws for fixing prices, allocating business among themselves, and co-
ercing customers through threats of strikes and boycotts); accord United States
v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n., 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966); United States v. Bitz, 282 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1960).
In the two decades leading up to RICO's enactment, various commissions
investigated the extent to which organized crime had infiltrated legitimate
businesses and labor unions. In 1967, a Presidential Commission exposed the
methods by which organized crime acquires control of various businesses:
"Control of business concerns has usually been acquired through one of four
methods: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling and other ie-
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Congress developed RICO's prohibition against infiltration of
businesses by racketeering activity38 and the Act's private civil
damages provision 39 directly from these early efforts and analo-
gous concepts of antitrust law.40 In contrast, nothing in RICO's
legislative history indicates that Congress intended RICO's con-
spiracy provision 4' to replicate the operation of the antitrust
laws. 42
Early versions of the bill that became RICO contained
neither the conspiracy provision nor the civil damages provision.
The Senate added RICO's conspiracy provision while the bill
was in the Senate Judiciary Committee.43 The Committee Re-
port contained scant explanation of the amendment or its pur-
pose. 44 Whereas debate on RICO generally was detailed and
gal activities; (2) accepting business interests in payment of the owner's gam-
bling debts; (3) foreclosing on usurious loans; and (4) using various forms of
extortion." PREsmENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIEry 190 (1967).
Various legislative proposals emerged to remedy the problems inherent in
attempts by organized crime to infiltrate legitimate businesses. Some propos-
als sought to amend the antitrust laws. See S. 2048, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1967). Other proposals were framed as independent legislation. For example,
the American Bar Association recommended separate legislation in lieu of
amending the antitrust laws, to avoid the "undesirable blending of otherwise
laudatory statutory objectives." 115 CONG. REc. 6994, 6695 (1969) (quoting
ABA Antitrust Section Report). The ABA believed that strict application of an-
titrust precedent would frustrate efforts to combat racketeering activity:
Moreover, the use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for com-
bating organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary ob-
stacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who might
seek treble damage recovery. Such a private litigant would have to
contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust
context-setting strict requirements on questions such as "standing to
sue" and "proximate cause."
Id. at 6995.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988); see supra notes 27-29 (providing text of
provisions).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); see supra note 33 (providing text of
provision).
40. See Hearings on S.30, and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control of
Organized Crime in the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970) [hereinafter House
Hearings] (amending the bill to include a private civil damages remedy "similar
to the ... remedy found in the anti-trust laws").
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); see supra note 30 (providing text of
provision).
42. Thus, although § 1 of the antitrust laws and § 1962(d) of RICO both
contain the word "conspiracy," Congress did not model the RICO provision after
the antitrust provision.
43. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 159 (1969).
44. The Senate Committee Report explained only that "[slubsection (d)
makes conspiracy to violate (a), (b), or (c) equally subject to the remedies of
474 [Vol. 78:467
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far-ranging,45 not one senator mentioned the conspiracy
amendment.46
After the Senate passed the bill, the House of Representa-
tives added a private civil damages remedy.4 7 Despite detailed
sections 1963 and 1964, below. See Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338
(1945)." Id. at 159.
In Singer, the Supreme Court determined the criminal scope of a conspir-
acy provision of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. Singer v.
United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340-42 (1945). The Court held that the provision
embraced all criminal conspiracies, and did not require the commission of an
overt act. Id. at 340-41; see also United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124
(11th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the holding of Singer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973
(1984). Thus, the Committee's cryptic reference to Singer offers no guidance for
interpreting RICO's conspiracy provision in a civil action.
Furthermore, in summarizing the bill before the full Senate debate on it,
neither of the bill's sponsors, Senators McClellan and Hruska, bothered to men-
tion the conspiracy amendment in their introductory remarks. See 116 CONG.
REc. 584-85 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 600-03 (remarks of Sen.
Hruska).
45. See supra note 44 (remarks of Sen. McClellan and Sen. Hruska); see
generally id. at 606-07 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 819-20 (remarks of Sen.
Scott); id. at 952 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
46. See supra notes 44-45. Senator McClellan, however, wrote a law re-
view article that was meant to provide "valuable legislative history and justifi-
cation" for the bill. 116 CONG. Rc. 35,298 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff). In his
article, Senator McClellan rebuffed critics who contended that RICO's "crime
within a crime" scheme might ensnare legitimate business owners as well as
"mobsters":
It is self-defeating to attempt to exclude from any list of offenses such
as that found in [RICO's definition of "racketeering activity"] all of-
fenses which commonly are committed by persons not involved in or-
ganized crime .... Unless an individual not only commits such a
crime but engages in a pattern of such violation, and uses that pattern
to obtain or operate an interest in an interstate business, he is not
made subject to proceedings under [RICO].
Sen. John J. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoT= DAME L. Rav. 55, 144 (1970). Signifi-
cantly, Senator McClellan did not point to the conspiracy provision as a sub-
stantive RICO prohibition. Id.
47. Members of the House Judiciary Committee added the civil damages
provision. House Hearings, supra note 40, at 520. The Committee modeled the
civil damages provision after a similar provision of the antitrust laws. See id.;
cf 15 U.S.C § 15 (1988) (allowing any person injured by a violation of the anti-
trust laws to recover damages). Commentators have described this amendment
as an "eleventh-hour addition" to the bill that was "debated only briefly."
Keuny, supra note 14, at 258
The Committee sent the bill to the full House for debate. Representative
Sisk, when introducing the bill before the full House, provided a detailed de-
scription of RICO's substantive provisions:
[RICO] contains a threefold standard, first making unlawful the re-
ceipt or use of income from "racketeering activity". .. to acquire an
interest in... an enterprise... ; second, prohibiting the acquisition of
any enterprise... through a "pattern" of "racketeering activity," and
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and voluminous debate, no Representative addressed the impact
of the private right of action on RICO's conspiracy provision.48
Because of the ambiguous language and lack of guidance in the
legislative history, the scope of RICO's private right of action
and conspiracy provisions, as they relate to each other, is
unclear.
C. CIVIL CONSPIRACY UNDER RICO
The conspiracy provision of § 1962(d), 49 in its criminal form,
does not require the commission of any overt act.50 In conjunc-
tion with the civil damages provision of § 1964(c), 5 ' however,
RICO creates an action for "civil conspiracy."5 2 Historically,
civil conspiracy takes many forms. In its statutory form, civil
third, proscribing the operation of any enterprise... through a "pat-
tern" [of] "racketeering activity."
116 CoNG. REc. 35,191 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Sisk). It is obvious that Repre-
sentative Sisk, in his reference to the "threefold standard," was referring to
§ 1962(a)-(c) of RICO. He ignored completely the conspiracy provision of
§ 1962(d).
48. For debates on the Organized Crime Control Act generally, see 116
CONG. Rxc. 35,191-217, 35,227-28, 35,287-364 (1970). For a discussion of RICO
specifically, see id. at 35,295-96 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,227-28 (re-
marks of Rep. Steiger); id. at 35,304 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 35,328
(remarks of Rep. Meskill).
The full House passed the bill on October 6, 1970. Id. at 35,363-64. Due to
time pressure, the Senate concurred with the House version of the bill without
creating a joint Senate-House conference committee to iron out potential differ-
ences. Id. at 36,292-96.
Senator McClellan described the House amendments as "comparatively
and largely minor." Id. at 36,293. Senator Hruska provided a title-by-title
summary of the amended bill:
[RICO] makes it unlawful to use income obtained from certain desig-
nated racketeering enterprises to acquire an interest in a business en-
gaged in interstate commerce, to use racketeering activities as a means
of acquiring such a business, or to operate such a business by racke-
teering methods. The title utilizes criminal forfeitures and civil reme-
dies modeled upon the antitrust laws to prevent and restrain
violations.
Id. at 36,294 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Like Representative Sisk, see supra
note 47, Senator Hruska failed to mention the conspiracy amendment.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); see supra note 30 (providing text of
provision).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983)
(discussing in detail the concept of criminal RICO conspiracy), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 973 (1984).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); see supra note 33 (providing text of
provision).
52. See, e.g., Medallion TV Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp.
1290, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (recognizing action for civil conspiracy), affd, 833
F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
476 [Vol. 78:467
RICO CONSPIRACY AND STANDING
conspiracy laws create a civil remedy for an individual injured
by the criminal acts of others.53 Not all acts, however, give the
plaintiff standing to pursue a private action.54 By contrast, at
common law, civil conspiracy is a "procedural device"55 that al-
lows a plaintiff to impute liability for any actionable wrong com-
mitted by one co-party to a conspiracy to all other parties to the
conspiracy.56 Generally, any overt, wrongful act in furtherance
of the conspiracy imposes liability on a party to the conspiracy.
57
53. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15 (1988) (conspiracy to restrain trade); 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) (conspiracy to deprive individuals of their civil rights).
54. The Supreme Court has imposed significant standing requirements on
plaintiffs seeking relief under both the civil conspiracy remedies of the antitrust
laws and under the civil rights laws. See supra note 53.
The Court has eschewed a literal interpretation of the antitrust laws that
would grant standing to virtually all plaintiffs:
One problem presented by [the conspiracy provision of the Sherman
Act] ... is that it cannot mean what it says. The statute says that
"every" contract [or combination or conspiracy] that restrains trade is
unlawful. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis perceptively noted, restraint is
the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the
entire body of contract law.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court has adopted a "Rule of Rea-
son" in the interpretation of§ 1, which states that whether a conspiracy violates
the antitrust laws depends on "whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition." Id. at 691.
In addition, the Court has held that in order to prove a private conspiracy
in violation of the civil rights laws, a plaintiff must show that some racial or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus motivated
the conspirators' action. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753, 758 (1993).
55. Jerry Whitson, Note, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U. L.
REV. 921, 926 (1979).
56. See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
In this context, a conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more
people to participate in unlawful behavior that results in injury caused by an
unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement, pursuant
to or in furtherance of the agreement. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
Furthermore, it is not the existence of the conspiracy itself, but the wrong-
ful acts that cause injury, that are actionable. See Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. at 21
("Unlike a criminal conspiracy, where the conspiracy itself forms the gist of the
crime, in a civil conspiracy, it is the overt acts producing damage to the plaintiff
that give rise to liability.").
57. Thus, by employing a "conspiracy theory," a plaintiff may assert that
"co-conspirators" who did not actually commit the alleged injury are nonethe-
less "secondarily" or "vcariously" liable for the plaintiffs injuries. See William
H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Prin-
ciples and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CoRP. L. 313, 314 (1988) ("The determi-
nation of who was involved centrally, and thus subject to primary liability,
usually can be made readily. The determination of who should be liable among
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The first federal court to consider the applicability of the
conspiracy provision of § 1962(d) in a civil setting held that the
conspiracy language tracks the common law of civil conspir-
acy.58 Subsequent cases have built upon this early analysis, but
have not offered an extensive rationale for applying common law
concepts, rather than statutory principles, to RICO's conspiracy
provision.59
those who were less involved is more difficult. This is the subject of secondary
liability.").
In Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the live-in compan-
ion of a house burglar was involved in a scheme with the burglar to make a
living from the resale of items stolen in the burglaries. Id. at 475-76. During a
botched burglary attempt, the burglar shot and killed a homeowner. The vic-
tim's spouse brought a wrongful death action against the burglar and, under a
conspiracy theory of secondary liability, against the burglar's live-in compan-
ion. Id. at 474. The court concluded that the murder was a "reasonably foresee-
able consequence of the scheme" that provided a sufficient basis for imposing
tort liability on the burglar's companion according to the law of civil conspiracy.
Id. at 487.
58. Medallion TV Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F.Supp. 1290,
1298 (C.D. Cal. 1986), af'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 492
U.S. 917 (1989); see also Laura A. Ginger, Causation and Civil RICO Standing:
When Is a Plaintiff Injured "by Reason of' a RICO Violation?, 64 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 849, 867 (1990) (noting the Medallion court's use of common law civil con-
spiracy and its focus on the overt act requirement).
In Medallion, the court focused on the distinction between criminal and
civil conspiracy and concluded that without overt acts causing injury, there is
no cause of action for conspiracy under RICO's civil damages provision. Medal-
lion, 627 F. Supp. at 1300. The court did not reach the issue of which particular
overt acts causing injury might confer standing, because it dismissed the claim
on other grounds. Id. at 1301.
59. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988). In Williams,
the court analyzed the scope of RICO's civil conspiracy provision. While the
Williams court discussed the broad liability that characterizes civil conspiracy,
it followed the Medallion court's reasoning. Thus, it focused on the "overt act"
requirement which distinguishes civil conspiracy from criminal conspiracy. Id.
at 642-44. The court did not address whether any act might fulfill the overt act
requirement.
Every circuit court interpreting RICO's conspiracy provision in a civil ac-
tion has analyzed the provision in similar terms. See Bowman v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993);
Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1992); Mi-
randa v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1991); Hecht v. Com-
merce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990); Shearin v. E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989).
At least two commentators have failed to appreciate that different acts cre-
ate liability under the common law and statutory forms of civil conspiracy. See
Blakey & Perry, supra note 23, at 948 n.281.
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D. SuPREME COURT RICO JURISPRUDENCE: GENERAi
PRINCIPLES
The Supreme Court has interpreted various aspects of
RICO on ten separate occasions. 60 When interpreting RICO, the
Court frequently has taken note of Congress's recommendation
in an uncodified clause of the original Act 6 1 that RICO be "liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."6 2 In its most
recent decision, however, the Court has held that the liberal con-
struction clause "is not an invitation to apply RICO to new pur-
poses that Congress never intended."
6 3
The Court has emphasized that if RICO's statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, such language ordinarily must be re-
garded as conclusive "in the absence of 'a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary.'" 64 When the Court has found
the language of RICO conclusive, it has rebuffed attempts by
lower courts to construe the terms of the Act more narrowly
than its language allows.6 5 Conversely, the Court also has re-
60. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993); Holmes v. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455 (1990); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Mal-
ley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479 (1985); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc. 473 U.S. 606
(1985); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981); see generally Ethan M. Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern"
of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement,
86 MICH. L. Rnv. 1745 (1988) (surveying Supreme Court RICO decisions
through 1985).
61. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a),
84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (uncodified).
62. Id.; see Russello, 464 U.S. at 27; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. Commenta-
tors, however, have suggested that courts should not give weight to the "liberal
construction" clause. See DAvm B. SMrIH & TERRANCE G. REED, CivIL RICO, 9
1.02 at 9-10.1 (1993) (arguing that, because the "liberal construction" phrase is
not codified in the statute, courts should not accord it more force than it is due,
and the clause does not require courts to liberally construe RICO in order to
determine what constitutes a violation of § 1962).
63. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
64. Russello, 464 U.S. at 20 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580).
65. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (holding that federal
courts do not exercise exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over RICO actions);
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that the
definition of "pattern" is not limited to predicate acts that demonstrate a nexus
to "organized crime"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488-95
(1985) (rejecting lower court interpretation of RICO limiting RICO's civil appli-
cability to actions involving defendants already convicted of criminal RICO
acts, or for injuries sustained which are "racketeering injuries"); Turkette, 452
U.S. at 580-93 (holding that RICO reaches both "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
enterprises).
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jected attempts by lower courts to construe liability under the
Act more broadly than the language and legislative history of
RICO dictate.66
If RICO is silent on a particular issue, however, or if the
Act's language is ambiguous, the Court has looked beyond
RICO's literal language by employing additional interpretive
tools. In some instances, the Court has used RICO's roots in an-
titrust law to help interpret some of the Act's ambiguous provi-
sions. 67 The Act's ambiguity also has led various members of
the Court to "invite"68 arguments contending that RICO is un-
66. See Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172-73. In Reves, the Court interpreted the
breadth of RICO's provision prohibiting an employee or associate of an enter-
prise from conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
the enterprises' affairs. Id. at 1166; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). The peti-
tioner, with the United States as amicus, urged the Court to interpret broadly
the term "conduct" to mean "carry on." Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168-69.
The Court rejected such a broad construction, holding that the provision
requires the employee or associate to exert "an element of direction" on the en-
terprise. Id. The court held that "Congress did not intend to extend RICO lia-
bility under § 1962(c) beyond those who participate in the operation or
management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at
1172 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
67. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311,
1318 (1992) (drawing analogy to antitrust law and holding that to bring a pri-
vate action under RICO, a plaintiff must show proximate causation, as opposed
to causation in fact, despite the literal language of the Act); Agency Holding
Corp. v. Mally-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 146-56 (1987) (holding that civil
RICO claims are governed by four-year statute of limitations analogous to pe-
riod applicable to private antitrust damage suits).
68. In H. J. Inc., various members of the Supreme Court speculated that
RICO, in its civil applications, may be unconstitutionally vague. 492 U.S. at
255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, questioned RICO's constitutionality:
[The majority opinion] makes it more rather than less difficult for a
potential defendant to know whether his conduct is covered by
RICO .... It seems to me this increases rather than removes the
vagueness .... No constitutional challenge to [RICO] has been raised
in the present case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest
Court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything
more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that
challenge is presented.
Id.
While Scalia's remarks were directed at the vagueness associated with
RICO's pattern requirement, see supra note 25, various commentators have
contended that other elements of RICO, and indeed the Act as a whole, are
equally subject to challenge on vagueness grounds. See, e.g., Terrance G. Reed,
The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. Rav. 722, 727-33 (1990)
(describing the nexus requirement of§ 1962(c) and the Act as a whole unconsti-
tutionally vague).
Since the Court's decision in H. J. Inc., numerous RICO defendants have
challenged RICO's constitutionality on vagueness grounds. See Kenny, supra
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constitutionally vague.69 This balancing between literal and
purposive constructions of the Act underlies the controversy sur-
rounding civil standing under RICO.
E. SuPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING STANDING TO SUE
UNDER § 1964(c)
Section 1964(c) provides a civil remedy for persons injured
"by reason of' a violation of § 1962.70 Subsections (a), (b), and (c)
of § 1962 outlaw "racketeering activity"7 1 connected with the in-
note 14, at 270 (citing cases); e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179
(1st Cir.) (defendant unsuccessfully argued that RICO failed to give adequate
notice to persons engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity that included
gambling and loan-sharking), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990). Indeed, some
courts have concluded that portions of RICO, as applied, are unconstitutionally
vague. E.g., Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(holding that RICO's pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague be-
cause defendants did not have adequate notice that mail and wire fraud and
money-laundering constituted a pattern of racketeering activity), affd, 976
F.2d 279 (1992).
69. The Supreme Court's "void for vagueness" doctrine is rooted in the U.S.
Constitution's guarantee of due process. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V. ("No per-
son shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."); Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This The End of
Rico?"-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to
RICO "Patternm ", 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1106, 1114 (1990).
The vagueness doctrine holds that, in order to withstand constitutional at-
tack, a statute must satisfy two requirements. First, the law must "'give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited,'" so that he or she may conform to what is lawful. Reed, supra note 68,
at 723 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)); e.g.,
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (striking down state statute
making it a crime to be a "gangster," because "[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes").
Second, the law must contain standards of enforcement sufficiently precise to
guide the judge and jury in ascertaining the offense and avoiding arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Bauerschmidt, supra, at 1114-15.
The Supreme Court traditionally has employed the vagueness doctrine to
invalidate criminal laws. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610
(1976). The Court, however, also has used it to strike down vague civil provi-
sions. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (discussing
vagueness doctrine as applied to civil statute); F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting
Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). In addition, the Court has noted that penal statutes,
even in their civil applications, must "possess the degree of certainty required
for criminal laws." H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 255
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting Co., 347
U.S. at 296).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) & Supp. 1991; supra note 33 (providing
text of provision).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991); see supra note 31 (providing
text of provision).
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vestment in,72 or operation of73 interstate enterprises. 74 Sub-
section (d), however, differs textually from subsections (a)
through (c) because it contains no explicit prohibition of "racke-
teering activity."7 5 This difference lies at the root of the contro-
versy surrounding the appropriate scope of standing under
RICO's civil conspiracy provision.
The Supreme Court has determined the standing require-
ments of only one of the four subsections of § 1962. In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,76 the Court interpreted the "by reason of'
requirement of § 1964(c) 7 7 in the context of a violation of
§ 1962(c), 7 8 one of the three substantive prohibitions against
racketeering of § 1962. The Sedima court rejected two extraju-
dicial limitations that circuit courts had imposed on civil RICO's
plain language. 79 The Court's decision was grounded in a liter-
alist approach to interpreting RICO. 80
Sedima is both the seminal discussion of RICO standing
and, in many respects, the source of the current controversy re-
garding how broadly courts should construe RICO's civil con-
spiracy provision. 8 ' Proponents of a broad standing rule stress
language in Sedima that ties the plaintiffs standing to the in-
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988); see supra note 27 (providing text of
provision).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(c) (1988); see supra notes 28-29 (providing text of
provisions).
74. See supra note 27.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); see supra note 30 (providing text of
provision).
76. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); see supra note 33 (providing text of
provision).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); see supra note 29 (providing text of
provision).
79. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-95. First, the Court held that a civil action
need not proceed only after a criminal conviction. Id. at 488-93. Second, the
Court held that a plaintiff utilizing § 1962(c) need not allege a distinct "racke-
teering injury" analogous to the "antitrust injury" an antitrust plaintiff must
allege. Id. at 493-95; cf Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977) (discussing the concept of "antitrust injury").
80. Answering critics of RICO's broad application in civil cases, the Court
in Sedima contended that "this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute
as written, and its correction must lie with Congress." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499;
see also SMrm & REED, supra note 62, 6.04, at 60-61.
81. See Flinders v. Datasec Corp., 742 F. Supp. 929, 933 (E.D. Va. 1990);
see also Ginger, supra note 58, at 856 ("Some federal courts have regarded
Sedima's standing ruling as applicable to any and all subsections of section
1962 of RICO, while other courts would restrict that holding to cases involving
claims based on subsection 1962(c).").
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jury caused by the "conduct constituting the violation."8 2 By
analogy, those proponents would extend this literalist approach
to a violation under § 1962(d).83 At the same time, advocates of
a more narrow view of standing stress other language in the
very next paragraph of Sedima that limits compensable injury
to harm caused by predicate acts of racketeering.8 4
The Court's most recent decision affecting standing under
RICO is Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.8 5 In
Holmes, the Court displayed a less literalist approach to inter-
preting RICO than it displayed in earlier cases.8 6 The Court
ruled that in order to bring a private action under § 1964(c), a
82. A violation of § 1962(c)... requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. ... Conducting an
enterprise that affects interstate commerce is obviously not in itself a
violation of § 1962, nor is mere commission of the predicate of-
fenses.... [Tihe plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to
the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the
conduct constituting the violation.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
83. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
84. The Court held that "where the plaintiff alleges each element of the
violation, the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate
acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is
the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added).
The scope of the Court's holding in Sedima, and the dichotomy that it cre-
ated, has divided courts interpreting RICO's other substantive racketeering
provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(b) (1988). The language of subsections (a)
and (b) is more specific than the language in subsection (d). Thus, a literalist
interpretation of § 1962(a) and (b) narrows liability under those provisions,
while a predicate act interpretation broadens liability.
For example, § 1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person to use money de-
rived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an enterprise. 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). Some courts, interpreting Sedima literally, require
that to have standing to sue under § 1962(a), a plaintiff must allege injury by
reason of the defendants use or investment of the racketeering income. See,
e.g., Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1990); Rose v. Bartle,
871 F.2d 331, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1989); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d
1147, 1151-52 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989). This strict interpre-
tation of standing under § 1962(a) has been described as the "investment use"
rule. See Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990).
Other courts have interpreted Sedima's holding less literally, and focused
instead on the "predicate causation" language as a general requirement when
deciding whether a plaintiff has standing under § 1962(a). These courts require
only that the plaintiff allege injury from any one of the criminal acts predicate
to racketeering. See id. at 836-40. District courts in circuits that have not re-
solved this issue have reached differing conclusions. See id. at 837 (citing
cases).
85. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
86. See SmI & REED, supra note 62, 1 6.04, at 63 (opining that after
Holmes, the holding of Sedima "has been effectively limited").
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RICO plaintiff must establish that the defendant's RICO viola-
tion proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.8 7 This restric-
tion on RICO is analogous to a similar standing requirement the
Court has imposed on antitrust plaintiffs.88 The court also iden-
tified as a central element of RICO standing analysis8 9 the "di-
rect relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged."90
In addition, the Court in Holmes specifically limited the
reach of its earlier opinion in Sedima.91 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that Congress, in enacting RICO as a body
of law separate from antitrust law, intended that antitrust
standing analysis never inform RICO standing analysis.92
87. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317.
88. The Court modeled its decision in Holmes on its analysis of a similar
provision of antitrust law in Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at
1316-21.
In Associated General, the Court construed § 15 of the antitrust laws,
which recognizes a private right of action for antitrust injuries, as incorporating
"the judicial gloss that avoided a simple literal interpretation" of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 534 (quoted in Holmes, 112 S.
Ct. at 1317). The Holmes Court concluded that because Congress modeled
RICO's civil action provision, § 1964(c), after the antitrust laws, similar rules
should apply. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317-18; see also, SMITH & REED, supra
note 62, 6.04, at 62-63.
89. SMITH & REED, supra note 62, 6.04, at 65.
90. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318. The Court provided three reasons, again
drawing from antitrust precedent, why it considered directness of injury central
to RICO standing:
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascer-
tain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation,
as distinct from other, independent factors. Second, quite apart from
problems of proving factual causation, recognizing claims of the indi-
rectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportion-
ing damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from
the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. And, fi-
nally, the need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by
the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly in-jured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as pri-
vate attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon
suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.
Id. (citations omitted).
91. See SMITH & REED, supra note 62, 1 6.04, at 65.
92. [T]here is no merit in [the plaintiffs] reliance on legislative history
to the effect that it would be inappropriate to have a "private litigant
... contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a purely anti-
trust context-setting strict requirements on questions such as 'stand-
ing to sue' and 'proximate cause.'" That statement is rightly
understood to refer only to the applicability of the concept of "antitrust
injury" to RICO, which we rejected in Sedima .... "
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F. THE CIRcurr SPLIT INVOLVING STANDING UNDER RICO's
CIVIL CONSPIRACY PROVISION
The circuit courts disagree on whether a plaintiff has stand-
ing to sue under § 1962(d) for conspiracy to violate RICO when
the plaintiff is injured by a conspirator's act done in furtherance
of the conspiracy, but when the act is not one of the enumerated
predicate acts that constitute "racketeering activity."93 All of
the circuit court cases addressing this issue involve plaintiffs
bringing wrongful discharge actions against former employers.9 4
In Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,95 the Third Circuit
became the first circuit court to interpret a plaintiffs standing
requirements under § 1962(d).96 The Shearin court read the
holding of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.97 broadly and held
that a plaintiff has standing under § 1962(d) when injured by
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318 n.15 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 495-97 (1985)).
93. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991); supra note 31 (providing
text of provision).
94. See Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993); Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 978 F.2d 344
(7th Cir. 1992); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991); Hecht
v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991);
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
Section 1962(c) prohibits an employee or associate of an enterprise from
conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). At first glance, it may appear more appropriate
for an employee alleging wrongful discharge for refusing to participate in an
employer's racketeering activity to utilize this provision rather than RICO's
civil conspiracy provision. The courts, however, have foreclosed plaintiffs from
using this strategy. Seven circuits have held that employees lack standing to
sue under § 1962(c) because their injuries were caused by the employers' deci-
sion to fire them, not by the predicate RICO activity. See, e.g., Pujol v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
injury stemming from discharge is not actionable under § 1962(c) because it
does not flow from defendanes RICO predicate acts of mail and wire fraud);
Reddy, 912 F.2d at 293-94; Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151,
154-56 (6th Cir. 1990); O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1560-63 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2620 (1990); Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1167-68; Bur-
dick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528-30 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Cullom v. Hibernia Natl Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215-18 (5th Cir. 1988).
The courts have held that the persons injured by conducting the affairs of
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity are the shareholders,
and that they alone have standing to sue under § 1962(c). See, e.g., Shearin,
885 F.2d at 1167.
95. 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1168-70.
97. 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text
(describing the Supreme Coures holding in Sedima).
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any act in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate RICO. 98 The
court contended that the language of § 1962(d) and Sedima do
"not mandate that racketeering activity cause the harm" in all
cases where plaintiffs utilize RICO.99
The Shearin court rejected a narrower reading of Sedima
that would have conferred standing only to plaintiffs whose inju-
ries derived from predicate acts of racketeering. The court ar-
gued that Sedima interpreted standing requirements solely in
the context of an alleged violation of § 1962(c).100 The Shearin
court distinguished a violation of § 1962(d), which it contended
does not require the commission of a racketeering act.' 0 '
The Shearin court also reasoned that Sedima compelled a
literal reading of the statute, and the court therefore concluded
that "classic conspiracy acts not only may, but should, so qual-
ify."'02 The court noted that it would be "anomalous" 03 to allow
a plaintiff to recover for harm suffered from the investment in,
control of, or conduct of an enterprise through racketeering,
10 4
98. In Shearin, the plaintiff alleged that she was hired as a Vice President
solely to give the appearance of legitimacy to a company that was in fact a front
for a fraudulent trust service scheme. Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1164. The plaintiff
alleged further that the sham company fired her to prevent her from disclosing
its illegal activities to state banking regulators. Id.
Analyzing whether the plaintiff had standing, the court focused on the first
of Sedima's two controversial paragraphs. See supra note 82. Thus, the court
held that a "'plaintiff only has standing if he has been injured... by the con-
duct constituting the violation.'" Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1167 (quoting Sedima,
473 U.S. at 496).
99. Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1169.
100. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
101. The Shearin court distinguished a violation under the first three sub-
sections of§ 1962, which it noted require the commission of a "racketeering act"
enumerated in § 1961(1), from a conspiracy to violate RICO:
Nothing in Sedima forecloses the possibility that harm arising from an
act predicate to conspiracy, yet distinct from the racketeering acts
listed in section 1961(1), might yet confer standing so long as the plain-
tiff has alleged a violation of section 1962(d).... Predicate acts for
conspiracy do not of necessity consist of section 1961(1) racketeering
activity. To the contrary, a conspiracy to commit the other RICO viola-
tions may occur absent the actual commission of the other violations or
the racketeering activities that underpin them.... Acts that further a
section 1962(d) conspiracy thus may cause harm even when they do
not themselves qualify as racketeering activity. Taking into account all
the provisions of section 1962, either racketeering activity or classic
overt conspiracy acts may qualify as "predicate acts" to a RICO viola-
tion that causes injury.
Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1169 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1170.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c) (1988); supra notes 27-29 (providing text of
provisions).
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yet preclude recovery for conspiracy to commit these violations
because the overt act that furthered the conspiracy was not it-
self a "racketeering act." 05
After Shearin, the circuit courts in Miranda v. Ponce Fed-
eral Bank,10 6 Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,'07 Reddy
v. Litton Industries, Inc.,108 and Bowman v. Western Auto Sup-
ply Co.'0 9 all expressly" o limited standing under § 1962(d) to
plaintiffs who allege injuries derived from one or more of the
fifty-four "racketeering acts" enumerated in § 1961(1)."'
The reasoning of the four circuits for their narrower inter-
pretation of standing under § 1962(d) is similar in many re-
105. Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1170. Decisions in the Third Circuit subsequent
to Shearin have, on non-standing grounds, both narrowed Shearin's scope, and
questioned its vitality. See SMIH & REED, supra note 62, 5.05, at 56-58 (cit-
ing Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 714 (3d Cir. 1991); Brittingham v. Mobil
Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 303 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991)).
106. 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991). In Miranda, the plaintiff was an employee
for a bank in Puerto Rico. She alleged that her employer wrongfully discharged
her after she cooperated with federal officials in a probe of possible money-laun-
dering activities of the bank. Id. at 43. Puerto Rico recognizes the tort of
wrongful discharge. Charles Zeno, Reshaping the Wrongful Discharge Act in
Puerto Rico, 25 REVISTA JUmICA V. INTRzAm. P.R. 589, 589 (1991); see supra
note 5 and accompanying text (describing the public policy exception that al-
lows at-will employees to bring wrongful discharge suits in tort against their
employers).
107. 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). InHecht, the plaintiff was employed in New
York as a sales representative for a well-known publisher of law and business
publications. He alleged that he was injured from loss of employment for refus-
ing to aid or abet his employer's alleged attempts to defraud its customers. Id.
at 22-23. New York state law provides a state civil remedy for private-sector
employees discharged by their employers for disclosing or refusing to partici-
pate in violations of state, federal, or local laws or regulations. N.Y. LAB. LAw
§ 740 (McKinney 1988); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
108. 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991). In
Reddy, the plaintiff alleged that his employer wrongfully discharged him be-
cause he refused to participate in a cover-up of illegal bribes to foreign govern-
ment officials intended to secure the award of certain military contracts. Id. at
292-93. California recognizes a tort for wrongful discharge. Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-36 (Cal. 1980); see supra note 5 and accompa-
nying text.
109. 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). In Bow-
man, the plaintiff alleged that his employer wrongfully discharged him for
speaking out against his employer's fraudulent scheme to "double bill" its mer-
chandise suppliers. Id. at 384. Missouri recognizes the tort of wrongful dis-
charge. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. The Eleventh Circuit also has dismissed a plaintiffs wrongful dis-
charge action based on conspiracy to violate RICO, but has done so in a less
explicit manner. See Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1987).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991); see supra note 31 (providing
text of provision).
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spects. Although the Hecht, Miranda, and Bowman courts all
took note of RICO's "liberal construction" clause," 2 they con-
cluded that Congress's purpose in enacting RICO should dictate
the scope of the ambiguous conspiracy provision." 3 Conse-
quently, the circuit courts reasoned that because RICO's general
aim is to outlaw racketeering activity, only plaintiffs who allege
injury from the commission of such acts have standing under the
Act." 4
In addition, both the Reddy and Miranda courts distin-
guished Shearin"15 on its facts, noting that Shearin's hiring and
firing were "essential" to the success of the conspiracy."16 In
contrast, the Reddy court found that in the fact pattern before it
"the alleged conspiracy was ongoing and the role of the dis-
charged employee in the conspiracy was peripheral, not central
to the very existence of the conspiracy.""17
Finally, the Hecht, Miranda, and Bowman courts reasoned
that state tort or statutory law already provided the plaintiffs
with a remedy for their injuries."18 The Bowman court also ar-
112. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing the liberal
construction clause); Hecht, 897 F.2d at 25; Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48; Bowman,
985 F.2d at 387-88.
113. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 25 ("Congress did not deploy RICO as an instrument
against all unlawful acts. It targeted only predicate acts catalogued under sec-
tion 1961(1).... Its purpose ... is to target RICO activities, and not other
conduct."); Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48 ("Congress painstakingly enumerated a
complete list of predicate acts in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). For judges, under a con-
spiracy rubric, to allow RICO damages for an injury caused other than by an
enumerated predicate offense would be tantamount to rewriting the statute....
[T]here are bounds to interpretive liberality."); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 388 ("Im-
posing the predicate act requirement on civil claims based on violations of
§ 1962(d) narrows the focus of those suits to the specific racketeering activity
that lies at the heart of the RICO statute.").
114. See supra note 113.
115. 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989); see supra notes 95-105 and accompanying
text (describing the Shearin court's reasoning).
116. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295; Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48 n.9.
117. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295. The facts of Miranda are different from the
situations in both Shearin and Reddy. While the employee in Miranda was not
hired to help advance the goals of the conspiracy, neither was she peripheral to
the conspiracy's existence. Miranda, 948 F.2d at 43; see supra note 106
(describing the facts of Miranda).
Furthermore, both the Miranda and Reddy courts stated that even if their
holdings were inconsistent with Shearin, they were unconvinced by the Shearin
court's reasoning. Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48 n.9; Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295.
118. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 24 ([Tihe purpose of civil RICO liability does not
extend to deterring any illegal act such as retaliatory firings for which there are
state and common law remedies. 'A defendant is not liable for treble damages
to everyone he might have injured by conduct other than that prohibited by
RICO.'") (quoting Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 635-
488
RICO CONSPIRACY AND STANDING
gued that a decision broadly construing standing would allow an
"artful pleader" to "circumvent the predicate act requirement
applicable to suits based on § 1962(a)-(c) simply by alleging a
conspiracy to commit those same substantive acts."119
II. SCHIFFELS v. KEMPER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
When Carolyn Schiffels sued her former employer for
wrongful discharge, 120 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the approach to standing analysis that the Third Cir-
cuit expounded in Shearin.121 The court held that Schiffels had
standing under § 1962(d)122 for injuries caused proximately by
any overt act in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy to violate
RICO, even though the act was not one of the fifty-four racke-
teering acts.' 23
The court applied a three-part analysis to reach this conclu-
sion. First, it found RICO's conspiracy language unambiguous,
and thus applied the statute's "literal" meaning.124 The court
found guidance from the general framework erected by the
Supreme Court in Sedima, which it concluded mandated a lit-
eral interpretation of § 1962(d). 125 Second, the Schiffels court
held that Sedima did not impose a general standing limitation
that applied to § 1962(d). 126 The Schiffels court contended that
the Supreme Court in Sedima, by rejecting the circuit court's
"overly restrictive"127 approach to standing under § 1962(c),
would not impose a standing limitation on § 1962(d) "without
even mentioning that section."128 Third, the court modeled its
37 (2d Cir. 1989)); Miranda, 948 F.2d at 49 (stating that RICO "cannot be used
as a surrogate for local law"); Bowman, 985 F.2d at 388 (reasoning that a per-
son should not be able to collect treble damages for state law claims merely by
alleging a conspiracy).
119. Bowman, 985 F.2d at 388.
120. 978 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1992).
121. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); see supra note 30 (providing text of
provision).
123. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 348-49; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp.
1991); supra note 31 (providing text of provision).
124. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 350.
125. Id.





decision on what it vaguely described as "traditional concepts of
conspiracy law."129
The court in Schiffels rejected the defendant's claim that the
"purpose" of all four of RICO's subsections in § 1962 is to target
only predicate racketeering acts enumerated in § 1961(1).130
The court concluded that "Congress could have written RICO to
state that only those injured by reason of predicate acts commit-
ted as part of a RICO violation could sue. It did not, and for
courts to read § 1964(c) as if that is what Congress wrote would
be 'tantamount to rewriting the statute.'"'131
III. COURTS SHOULD LIMIT STANDING UNDER
§ 1962(d) TO PLAINTIFFS WHO ALLEGE
INJURIES FROM RACKETEERING ACTS
If other courts adopt the view of civil conspiracy standing
expounded by the Seventh Circuit in Schiffels, civil liability
under RICO will expand dramatically, leading to further "feder-
alization" of state criminal and common law.13 2 According to
Schiffels, any act that is tortious under common law or statute
could subject the actor to RICO liability-including treble dam-
129. Id. at 348. The Seventh Circuit based its discussion of traditional no-
tions of conspiracy law on its decision in United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d
489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986). Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 348.
In Neapolitan, the Seventh Circuit noted that RICO's criminal conspiracy
provision does not create new substantive crimes, but only harsher penalties
and new remedies for existing crimes when carried out in a specific context.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 495-98.
130. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 349-50; see supra note 113 and accompanying text
(discussing the Miranda, Hecht and Bowman courts' holdings that Congress's
purpose in enacting RICO should determine the Act's scope).
131. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 350 (quoting Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948
F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991)).
132. In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1985), Justice
Marshall argued in dissent that the majority had interpreted standing under
§ 1962(c) of RICO too broadly:
The court's interpretation of the RICO statute quite simply revolution-
izes private litigation; it validates the federalization of broad areas of
state common law of frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-
established federal remedial provisions. We do not lightly infer a con-
gressional intent to effect such fimdamental changes. To infer such
intent here would be untenable, for there is no indication that Con-
gress even considered, much less approved, the scheme that the Court
today defines.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While Justice Marshall's criticism of the Sedima majority may be dubious
given the plain language of § 1962(c), his reasoning directly counters a broad
standing rule under RICO's civil conspiracy provision, § 1962(d), which is not
plain. See supra note 30 (providing text of provision).
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ages and attorney's fees' 3 3-when committed in furtherance of a
conspiracy to violate RICO. While the cases decided thus far by
the circuit courts all involve wrongful discharge actions, the
range of actions that potential plaintiffs might bring under the
"conspiracy to violate RICO" rubric is limitless. Indeed, a civil
RICO action based on the tort of nuisance might be cognizable
under § 1962(d).134 Thus, under the Schiffels approach, RICO is
turned on its head: the conspiracy provision eclipses the three
substantive racketeering provisions that inform it. As the First
Circuit has noted, "the RICO statute ... is not entirely open-
ended. It cannot be used as a surrogate for local law, as a pan-
acea to redress every instance of man's inhumanity to man, or as
a terrible swift sword capable of righting all the wrongs of a
troubled world." 3 5 Equally important, broad construction of
RICO's conspiracy provision also eviscerates the bulk of juris-
prudence interpreting the Act's three racketeering provisions.' 36
A construction of RICO's civil conspiracy provision that im-
poses such vast liability also raises questions about the Act's
constitutionality. Already, critics of RICO contend that the Act
is unconstitutionally vague.' 37 Given the innumerable differ-
ences in state statutory and common law, construing § 1962(d)
broadly to recognize standing for plaintiffs who allege injury
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); supra note 33 (providing text of
provision).
134. See Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 809 n.1
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that residents acting together to violate RICO may be
liable for conspiracy under § 1962(d)), reh'g granted, 952 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir.),
and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
135. See Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1991); see
also Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (N.D. Ill.
1991), rev'd, 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992) (arguing that broad construction of
§ 1962(d) would "open the RICO portals to remote or tangential consequences of
illegal activities that are themselves often extraordinarily complex and far-
reaching").
136. See, e.g., Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th
Cir.) (warning that a broad construction of standing under RICO's conspiracy
provision, § 1962(d), would allow "artful pleaders" to "circumvent the predicate
act requirement applicable to suits based on § 1962(a)-(c)"), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2459 (1993); see also Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 9, Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990) (No.
91-95), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991) (arguing against broad standing rule);
supra note 94 (explaining that courts unanimously hold that an employee
wrongfully discharged by his or her employer for refusing to participate in rack-
eteering activity does not have standing to sue under § 1962(c)).
137. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 805, 844 (1990) (arguing that "RICO should fit into that category of laws
that have been held void for vagueness"); see supra note 68 (summarizing con-
stitutional attacks against RICO).
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from any wrongful act may invite the Supreme Court to strike
down RICO as a whole, or at least the Act's conspiracy provision,
as unconstitutionally vague.138
A. COURTS SHOULD CONSTRUE § 1962(d) NARRowLY IN LiGHT
OF ITS AMBIGUITY
The scope that Congress intended for § 1962(d) is not clear
from the provision's language. In its criminal and civil forms,
the provision implies radically different concepts. 13 9 Given the
difficulty in applying RICO's conspiracy provision in a civil con-
text,' 40 a literal reading of the provision is unwarranted. Fur-
ther, the cryptic legislative history surrounding the conspiracy
provision demonstrates that Congress failed to consider all of
the implications and complexities of applying the provision in a
civil context. 41
If Congress intended the conspiracy provision, in its civil ap-
plications, to expand dramatically the scope of RICO far beyond
the racketeering acts that it "painstakingly enumerated,""
42
Congress would have stated this intention explicitly.143 In con-
trast, the legislative history indicates that Congress gave little
consideration to the conspiracy provision. The meager discus-
sion that took place focused on application of the conspiracy pro-
vision in its criminal form, not on application of the provision in
civil cases."' Unlike so much else of RICO, the conspiracy pro-
vision was not modeled after existing antitrust law;145 its theo-
retical underpinnings therefore are not linked to early efforts by
the Justice Department to combat organized crime through en-
138. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing the vague-
ness doctrine and its application to RICO).
139. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (describing the various
forms of "civil conspiracy").
141. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (describing the scant leg-
islative history surrounding the adoption of RICO's conspiracy provision).
142. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991).
143. Thus, the canon of interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
applicable. By carefully enumerating the predicate acts that constitute racke-
teering, Congress implicitly eschewed a more expansive scope. See, e.g., Nash-
ville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958) (holding that
provisions of the Clayton Act that recognize private actions resulting from acts
forbidden by the "antitrust laws," as defined elsewhere in the Act, do not permit
plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries caused by violations of other laws that "may
be colloquially described as ... 'antitrust statute[s]"').
144. See supra note 44 (describing the Senate's reference to criminal con-
spiracy jurisprudence).
145. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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forcement of the antitrust laws. 146 Courts that broadly construe
§ 1962(d) ignore this scant legislative history, and thereby un-
justifiably attribute to Congress an intention to expand the
scope of RICO far beyond the racketeering act framework upon
which the Act was constructed.
Even if the "plain meaning" of the conspiracy provision, in a
civil context, is clear, courts can apply few statutes in a literal,
mechanistic fashion without sometimes producing absurd re-
sults.147 On rare occasions, the Supreme Court has sanctioned
absurd results by applying strictly the literal language of a stat-
ute. 148 The Court, however, has "typically attempted to justify
the harsh results in light of the legislative history and purpose
of the statute."149 The context of § 1962(d) of RICO, the Act's
legislative history, and its purpose do not support the tortured
results reached by construing the conspiracy provision broadly
through a literal reading of its language. 150
A more sound approach, used by the Court on other occa-
sions, eschews a literalist construction of a statute's "plain
meaning," and instead interprets the statute consistent with its
146. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text (describing RICO's legis-
lative history).
147. In United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), the
Supreme Court repeated the well-established canon that statutes should be in-
terpreted broadly to accomplish their purpose:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a
statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give ex-
pression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of them-
selves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we
have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to ab-
surd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words
to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole"
this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.
Id. at 543 (footnotes omitted). But cf. Brooks, supra note 10, at 437 n.81 (argu-
ing that the purpose of § 1962(d) may not parallel the purpose of RICO's sub-
stantive prohibitions, §§ 1962(a)-(c)).
148. DAVID N. ESKRIDGE & PHIIP P. FmcxEy, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEG-
ISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 593 (1987).
149. Id.; e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571-74
(1982) (interpreting literally a provision of federal maritime law); TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 174-87 (1978) (interpreting literally a provision of the Endan-
gered Species Act).
150. See, e.g., Ginger, supra note 14, at 675, 676 n.19 (describing Williams v.
Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988), a wrongful discharge case brought
under § 1962(d) in which the defendant settled for $25 million after the jury
awarded $69.5 million to two former vice presidents).
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purposes and policies. 151 The purpose of RICO is to eradicate
racketeering activity; this fact alone should limit standing to
plaintiffs who allege injuries from one or more of the enumer-
ated racketeering acts.15 2 Nine of these enumerated acts are for
racketeering acts "chargeable under State law."15 3 Given the
generality with which RICO describes these nine acts, however,
limiting standing under § 1962(d) to plaintiffs who allege injury
from racketeering acts still imposes vast liability on potential
defendants.154
Construing § 1962(d) narrowly also is consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions' 55 that display a more reasoned ap-
proach to interpreting RICO than the strict literalism the Court
displayed in a portion of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.15 6 In
any event, the Court's approach to standing in Sedima does not
dictate a broad civil conspiracy standing rule under § 1962(d).
Sedima involved extrajudicial limits on RICO's plain lan-
guage. 157 In contrast, the scope of RICO's conspiracy provision
is not plain.' 58
151. See, e.g., FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 430-440
(1986) (construing the purpose of a provision of the federal deposit insurance
program); Midatlantic Natl Bank v. N.J. Dep't. Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
500-07 (1985) (construing the purpose of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code);
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) ("It is a well-estab-
lished canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal
language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain pur-
pose of the statute .... "); see also EsKIDGE & FRIcKEY, supra note 148, at 593.
152. See Ethan M. Posner, supra note 60, at 1763-68 (arguing that civil
RICO's pattern requirement should be construed narrowly because RICO's pur-
pose is to eradicate organized crime's infiltration of business, and because there
was very little congressional debate concerning the ramifications of amending
RICO to include a civil damages provision).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991); see supra note 31 (providing
text of provision).
154. The Supreme Court has observed that the "'extraordinary' uses to
which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth
of the predicate offenses .... ." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500
(1985) (emphasis added).
For example, many crimes fall under RICO's prohibition of acts "dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991);
supra note 31 (providing text of provision). Under Minnesota law, 22 acts deal-
ing with the sale or possession of "prohibited drugs" are punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year. MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01-.027 (1992). Thus, all of
these crimes are predicate acts to racketeering activity.
155. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993); Holmes v. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
156. 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's holding in Sedima).
157. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 30 (providing text of provision).
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B. A NARROW STANDING RULE PROMOTES UNIFORMITY AND
EQUITY IN STATE-BY-STATE APPLICATION OF RICO
A broad reading of RICO's civil conspiracy provision that
grants standing to plaintiffs who allege injury from any overt act
results in different treatment and unequal access to RICO as a
remedy in the various states, due to the existence of inconsistent
statutory and tort law remedies among states. Carolyn Schiffels
sued her former employer alleging that she had been wrongfully
discharged. 159 Such a claim was available to her only because
Illinois recognizes a "public policy exception" to the general rule
that an at-will employee may be fired for any reason or for no
reason, at any time.160 Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize
the existence of such an action. Four jurisdictions do not pro-
vide, either by statute or at common law, a public policy excep-
tion to the general at-will rule.161 In addition, four other
jurisdictions recognize a public policy exception only for public
employees in limited circumstances. 162 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit's approach to standing under Schiffels would deny access
to certain victims of wrongful discharge in these eight states,
while granting standing to plaintiffs in other states.
In the remaining jurisdictions that recognize a "public pol-
icy" civil action for both public and private sector employees, the
contours of the action are not uniform.163 Thus, under the Sev-
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 5 (discussing the at-will doctrine and the public policy
exception).
161. Alabama, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Mississippi do not rec-
ognize the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. See Hinrichs
v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala. 1977) (per curiam) (holding
that the public policy exception is "too vague" to overturn the state's long his-
tory of upholding termination of at-will employees for any reason or for no rea-
son); Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831, 831 (D.C. 1981) (per
curiam); Evans v. Bibb Co., 342 S.E.2d 484,485-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss. 1981).
162. Alaska, Delaware, Florida, and Utah all have "whistleblower" statutes
of one form or another. These statutes prohibit an employer from discharging a
public employee for reporting a violation of state or federal law. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 39.90.100-.150 (1987 & Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115
(1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -
9 (1986 & Supp. 1993); DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALATORY DISCHARGE 177-82 (1991) (listing state public sector whistleblower
statutes).
163. Compare Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 So.2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 414 So.2d 379 (La. 1982) (holding that employee had no right of
action for wrongful discharge based on his refusal to violate state deceptive
practices statute) with Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 870-78
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that employee discharged for threatening to report
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enth Circuit's view of standing, a plaintiff in one state can take
advantage of the Act, while a plaintiff in another state, who may
have suffered the same injury, cannot utilize RICO.164
Framed in this context, the question of how broadly courts
should construe RICO's conspiracy provision may be analogous
to determining whether courts should allow state laws to define
the boundaries of a federal statute, or whether courts instead
should fashion a uniform federal rule to govern the statute. In
this area of law, the Supreme Court has developed a three-factor
analysis for determining whether to adopt a uniform federal
rule.165 Courts should consider whether a need for uniformity
exists, an examination which often requires an inquiry into con-
gressional intent;166 whether application of a state rule would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal program;167 and
whether the application of a federal rule would disrupt commer-
cial relationships predicated on state law.' 68
If courts applied this analysis to RICO's civil conspiracy pro-
vision, they most likely would grant standing only to plaintiffs
who allege injuries from acts predicate to racketeering. RICO
was enacted as a national strategy to fight crime;' 69 uniformity
is essential to accomplish this national goal. In addition, appli-
cation of myriad state laws to the Act and the resultant lack of
employer's violation of federal regulations had sufficiently stated claim under
Missouri's public policy exception).
164. Flinders v. Datasec Corp., 742 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Va. 1990), under-
scores the state-by-state inequity that may result when plaintiffs have standing
to sue when injured by any independently wrongful act. In Flinders, the plain-
tiff brought a § 1962(d) wrongful discharge action alleging that his former em-
ployer terminated him for refusing to participate in a kickback scheme
involving the sale of computers. Id. at 931.
The court reasoned that § 1962(d) should be interpreted to grant standing
to plaintiffs alleging injury from any injurious, independently wrongful act in
furtherance of a conspiracy to violate RICO. Id. at 931-35. The court, however,
denied standing to the Flinders plaintiff because Virginia's common law public
policy exception "was limited to public rights embodied in state statutes," as
opposed to "private rights." Id. at 935.
165. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).
In the context of RICO standing, the "uniform federal rule" would be the adop-
tion of a racketeering act requirement for all plaintiffs alleging violations of
RICO's civil conspiracy provision.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967)
(holding that "Congress, of course, is the primary source of federal law, and the
federal courts must adhere to the intent of Congress whenever this intent is
discernible").
167. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
168. Id. at 729.
169. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing RICO's legislative
history).
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uniformity in RICO's application frustrates the administration
of this federal program. °70 Finally, there is little probability
that a uniform federal rule would disrupt commercial relation-
ships predicated on state law. To the contrary, narrowly con-
struing RICO's conspiracy provision would bring greater
certainty to commercial relationships by limiting liability to in-
dividuals who commit racketeering acts.
C. A NARRow STANDING RuLE IS NOT UNFAIR TO VICTIMS OF
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, GIVEN THE AvAnAIuiTY OF
OTHER REMEDIES
As the courts in Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,' 7 '
Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank,172 and Bowman v. Western
Auto Supply Co.173 have recognized, construing § 1962(d) nar-
rowly and thereby denying RICO standing to individuals wrong-
fully discharged does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing an
action at common law, if a remedy exists in his or her jurisdic-
tion. Rather, the plaintiff merely is prevented from utilizing
RICO's more advantageous treble damages and attorney's fees
provisions. 174 Courts often have awarded substantial damage
awards, including punitive damages in tort actions involving
wrongful discharge.' 75 Moreover, many state "whistleblower"
statutes provide for civil damages and attorney's fees for em-
ployees discharged for refusing to violate state or federal law.' 7 6
In any event, if there is no remedy in a particular jurisdiction, a
discharged employee already is prevented from utilizing RICO's
conspiracy provision, because even courts construing § 1962(d)
170. Cf Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 ("Federal programs that 'by their
nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessi-
tate formulation of controlling federal rules.") (quoting United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)); see Lona L. Triplett, Comment, Dickerson v. New
Banner Institute, 71 VA. L. REv. 1239, 1240-42 (1985) (examining the Supreme
Courts traditional approach when deciding whether to formulate a federal
rule).
171. 897 F.2d 21, 24-26 (2d Cir. 1990).
172. 948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991).
173. 985 F.2d 383, 386-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993).
174. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Southwest Forest Indus. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 352, 357 (10th
Cir. 1989) (upholding jury verdict awarding $250,000 in actual damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages under Kansas law of wrongfl discharge), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990); see also Lax K. LARSON & PHII BoRowsKy, 1
UNJUST Dis assALs § 9A.03[21 at 42-43 (1990) (listing public policy cases).
176. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. §§ 181.931-.935 (1992); see also WESTMAN, supra
note 162, at 177-87 (providing a state-by-state list of "whistleblower" statutes
that protect private and public sector employees).
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broadly require that the plaintiff show injury from an overt,
wrongful act.177
D. A NARRow STANDING RuLE AvoIDs Co imEXTy IN
APPORTIONING DAMAGES AMONG VIcnMs OF
RACKETEERING AcTIvITY
Finally, there exists little economic justification for allowing
plaintiffs who are only tangential victims of a RICO scheme to
utilize the Act's civil damages and attorney's fees provisions.'
78
Congress enacted RICO's treble damages and attorney's fees
provisions in part to provide incentives to those injured by rack-
eteering activity to "prosecute" the crime under a "private attor-
ney general" theory.'79 Granting standing to plaintiffs who
allege injury from all overt acts, not just racketeering acts, does
not advance this goal. In addition, suits of this nature diminish
the defendant's resources available to pay the actual victims of
injuries from racketeering acts,'8 0 and require the courts to
adopt complex rules for apportioning damages among various
RICO plaintiffs.' 8 '
CONCLUSION
In Schiffels, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs who al-
lege injury from any unlawful act have standing to sue under
RICO's civil conspiracy provision. In arriving at this decision,
however, the Seventh Circuit failed to appreciate the awkward
structure of RICO's conspiracy provision, which makes applica-
177. In Flinders v. Datasec Corp., 742 F. Supp. 929, 931-35 (E.D. Va. 1990),
the Court construed RICO's conspiracy provision broadly, but nonetheless de-
nied RICO standing to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had not stated a cause
of action under state law. All other courts construing RICO's conspiracy provi-
sion have implicitly adopted the Flinders wrongful act requirement.
178. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311,
1318 (1992); supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Holmes).
179. See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; supra note 90 and accompanying text
(explaining the private attorney general theory and its relationship to RICO
standing).
180. Situations where defendants wrongfully discharge employees because
of a RICO scheme represent a fairly compelling example of why courts may be
tempted to construe RICO's civil conspiracy provision broadly. Nonetheless, in
order to preserve RICO's actual purpose, courts should require victims of
wrongful discharge to pursue their remedies through the enforcement of state
law. Such a rule would preserve resources for the true victims of racketeering
activity.
181. See Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; supra note 90 and accompanying text
(explaining difficulties of apportioning damages among various plaintiffs).
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tion of the provision difficult in a civil action. Although the deci-
sion in Schiffels may comport literally with a mechanistic
reading of RICO, it offends the purpose of the Act and misreads
its legislative history. To ensure that RICO is not turned on its
head, courts should reject the Schiffels rule and instead limit
standing under § 1962(d) to RICO plaintiffs who allege injury
from predicate acts of racketeering. A narrow view of standing
is consistent with RICO's purpose and will prevent the further
federalization of state law, avoid state-by-state inequities in the
application of RICO, eliminate duplication of existing remedies,
and help courts fairly apportion damages among various plain-
tiffs who bring RICO actions.

